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Introduction 
Thomas Pogge is Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs and 
Director of the Global Justice Program at Yale University, Professor of Political 
Philosophy at the Centre for Professional Ethics of the University of Central 
Lancashire and Research Director at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at 
the University of Oslo. His life and career have been dedicated to understanding 
what economic and political factors drive poverty and how poverty worldwide 
might be defeated. Pogge is a member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and 
Letters as well as co-founder of Academics Stand Against Poverty 
(www.academicsstand.org), an international network aiming to enhance the impact 
of scholars, teachers and students on global poverty, and of Incentives for Global 
Health, a team effort toward developing a complement to the pharmaceutical patent 
regime that would improve access to advanced medicines for the poor worldwide 
(www.healthimpactfund.org).  In 2012-13, he chaired the Task Force on Illicit 
Financial Flows, Poverty and Human Rights of the International Bar Association’s 
Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI). In 2013, his article “Are We Violating the 
Human Rights of the World’s Poor?” was awarded the Gregory Kavka Prize in 
Political Philosophy.2 Pogge’s recent publications include: Politics as Usual: What 
Lies behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric, 2010, and World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd 
edition, 2008, both published by Polity Press. In 2008, he also co-edited, with Darrel 
Moellendorf and Keith Horton respectively, Global Justice and Global Ethics, two 
volumes of seminal essays published by Paragon House.3 
Pogge’s proposals have strong relevance for political philosophers—who are 
concerned with examining possibilities for changing the institutional structures that 
produce global inequalities—and also to policy makers, who can apply his reasoning 
to real world situations. Pogge has insightfully criticized the current patent system 
for depriving the poor of access to advanced medicines. To solve this problem, he 
proposes to create an option for pharmaceutical innovators to be rewarded, from 
public funds, according to the health impact of their innovation on condition that 
they sell it at cost.4 Another of his innovative proposals is a Global Resources 
Dividend (GRD) that would charge states for the use of the Earth’s natural 
resources, such as oil, gas and water, and for polluting the natural environment by 
discharging waste into soil, water and air. GRD revenues would fund development 
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in the world’s poor regions,5 thus enabling the world’s poor to obtain a fairer share 
of the Earth, which in principle belongs to all human beings. In addition to these 
proposals, Pogge has recently been working on creating a more adequate measure 
for tracking poverty and gender disparities6 and on promoting the curtailment of 
illicit financial flows facilitated by tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions and shell 
companies.7 His proposals are ambitious in their ideals and deeply philosophical. At 
the same time, Pogge’s proposals are often supported by strong empirical data and 
statistical analyses, offering evidence for the need to modify actual laws and policies.  
In the following interview, Pogge focuses his attention on the situation in Brazil, 
a country that he says can exert its increasing influence on the design of global 
institutions. He anticipates the challenges coming for Brazil in combating poverty 
and gender disparities. He discusses the positive and negative aspects of the Bolsa 
Família programme, and he suggests that the government should extend its benefits 
to a larger proportion of the population in order to gain more support from the 
public. He believes the Bolsa Família programme is well-designed and that its 
implementation is essential to mitigating the absurd inequalities that so strongly 
polarize society and jeopardize democracy in Brazil. To distribute resources to the 
poor is not a question of charity, as it was considered in the old days, he explains. 
He finds no justification for affluent Brazilians to control all the country’s resources 
while the poor are deprived of their fair share. Pogge is also concerned that, owing 
to increasing capital mobility, globalization will tend to benefit Brazil’s rich, who 
also find it much easier to evade taxes. Therefore, in addition to the intervention of 
social programmes, Pogge recommends that the Brazilian government ensure that 
the country’s wealth is properly taxed and distributed. 
 
I. Structural Poverty, Social Justice, and the Bolsa Família programme in Brazil 
Duarte: I will start by citing a provocative sentence from your book: “Even a mere 80 
years ago, the poor and unemployed were still often seen as lazy and delinquent 
merely on the ground that others of equally humble origins had risen from dishwasher 
to millionaire” (Pogge 2010: 16). When discussing interactional and institutional 
moral duties, you believe that decades ago, people “did not understand the structural 
constraints on social mobility” (Pogge 2010: 16), implying that poverty is in part a 
consequence of a lack of opportunities and possibilities. According to you, people often 
did not understand that this structural poverty can be influenced by an “intelligent 
redesign of the rules” and institutions (Pogge 2010: 16). You cite the Bolsa Família 
programme in Brazil as an example of an intelligent institutional redesign toward the 
promotion of social justice in a place where the inequalities were enormous. Indeed, 
the Bolsa Família programme seems to have accomplished its goal when, according to 
the Brazilian government, in February 2013, extreme poverty had officially been 
eradicated from the country. Ten years after the programme began, one-fourth of the 
population benefits from it at a cost of a bit more than 0.5 per cent of the country’s 
GDP.8 Despite these positive results, a substantial part of the Brazilian middle class 
aggressively attacks the initiative. They consider the “family allowance” to really be a 
“laziness grant”. According to them, the programme has a pure electoral purpose, 
promoting no real and long-term benefits for the Brazilian population. Their 
contention is, however, contradicted by several studies showing positive results 
produced by the implementation of the programme,9 as if they were eighty years late 
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in this discussion. My questions are: What could explain such disconnection between 
the government and the middle-class public opinion? Does the Brazilian middle class 
truly have anything to fear? 
Pogge: This disconnect between the government and middle-class public opinion 
might be explained by the fact that, in Brazil, the programme does not benefit a 
majority of the population, but only one-quarter of them. When a social safety net 
was first instituted in the United States and in Germany, for example, the benefits 
were enjoyable by a majority of the population. These successful examples show us 
how to build support for social programmes: benefits must be enjoyable by the 
majority of the electorate, at least to the extent that they expect to derive significant 
benefit from the programmes during some period of their life. But such broad 
diffusion of benefit may be difficult to achieve. Brazilian society is among the most 
unequal in the world; and in a situation of extreme inequality, it is difficult to 
construct social programmes so that they benefit the majority of the population. 
The needs of the extremely poor minority are too urgent to allow dilution of these 
programmes.  
Ideally, we want the programme to cover at least half the population because this 
could produce a stable electoral majority in its support; but of course we also want 
the programme to be focused on really benefiting the needy, the poor. Without such 
a focus, the programme becomes too expensive or too diluted with regard to the 
very poor. In the case of Brazil, the decision was in favour of a programme that is 
more focused at the cost of being harder to establish and defend politically. At a cost 
of half a per cent of GDP, the Bolsa Família programme benefits one-fourth of the 
population but excludes a still-struggling segment of the middle class that sees its 
contribution to the programme as excessive and does not really want to pay for its 
support of the poor. Such resentment must be considered when designing this type 
of social programme. It should be discussed with the society: why should we pay for 
these benefits? How broad do we want the programme to be? It should become clear 
to the majority of Brazilians that, even though the programme does not benefit 
them directly, they nonetheless have reason to support it. 
As regards the claim that this programme is a benefit for “lazy” people—well, it 
might be, of course. A programme can be badly designed; but, from what I know, I 
do not think this is true of the Bolsa Família programme. It has incentives attached 
to it, such as immunizations, education, and female participation, which produce 
actual benefits for the entire country. If, for instance, families immunize their 
children, then the country will save a considerable amount of money on 
hospitalizations that would otherwise have to be paid for by SUS, the Brazilian 
public health system. Furthermore, the immunization of children also averts or 
curtails the spread of infectious diseases. Incentives to immunize one’s children 
produce social benefits, benefits for all, because anyone’s children are potentially at 
risk of being infected by a child who was not immunized. Such incentives are a 
public good, benefitting the whole country and all its people. The same can be said 
of education, which produces a more capable and creative labour force, which in 
turn enables faster and better economic development. Education also produces a 
more critical and enlightened electorate, which in turn results in a more 
sophisticated public policy discourse and better governance and administration. So 
a well-educated citizenry is also a public good, a form of social capital that enhances 
the economic opportunities and quality of governance of all. This is especially 
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obvious in the case of women who have historically suffered grave educational 
disadvantages: a society loses greatly if it wastes the creativity and talents of most of 
its women; and everyone gains when these assets are developed and allowed to 
thrive. For all these reasons, I am convinced that the characterization of the Bolsa 
Família programme as welfare for the lazy is decidedly inappropriate.  
In conclusion, let me say that I am commenting on conditions in Brazil with 
some trepidation because I recognize that, as an outsider, I am not as familiar with 
the situation as many insiders are. So what I say here should be read with this 
caution in mind. 
 
II. The Limits of Distributive Justice  
Duarte: Imagining a situation where everybody has their basic needs fulfilled, but 
society still maintains large social stratification and a low degree of 
decommodification, how much would you say we can claim for distributive justice?   
Pogge: It is really important for a country to have a spirit of community. Inequality 
is corrosive. It affects our sense of commitment to the common good, which is what 
makes us feel we belong together and are all part of the same society. Brazil is a good 
example of what such corrosive effect of inequality can do to a country. There is a 
real class division there, which results in hostility between the rich and the poor. 
Social stratification makes it more difficult for a country to solve its problems 
because the different groups cannot agree with one another. Therefore, it is on the 
whole much better to have less inequality rather than more inequality, even when 
basic needs are ostensibly fulfilled for all. Furthermore, a country has better chances 
of establishing a successful political system, a democratic political system, when the 
interests of most people in regard to institutional design and public policies are 
reasonably well aligned. People will then think in terms of what is best for their 
country rather than in terms of what is best for their particular social class. The 
latter thinking can lead to divisive politics, which can deteriorate into a kind of class 
warfare in which each side is trying to woo the median voter, the middle class, in 
order to win a majority of the electorate. When political power shifts from one side 
to the other, the winner will make fundamental changes to the social institutions 
and policies that are most relevant to the national income and wealth distribution: 
to the tax system and to social programmes. The winner may even try to change the 
electoral system so as to make it harder for the other side to regain political power. 
Such fundamental changes back and forth are costly for the country—just think of 
the cost of building up some social programme with appropriate administrative staff 
and then shutting it down again a few years later. And the hostility and nastiness of 
such politics is another great cost, as we can see currently in the United States, 
where the people’s confidence in the various branches of government has all but 
disappeared. In order to avoid such problems, in order to maintain a harmonious 
democracy and an economy that manifests solidarity and allows all citizens to 
contribute according to their full potential, we need to ensure that social and 
economic inequalities remain reasonably small. This ensures that the interests of the 
rich are not too sharply opposed to those of the rest, that not too much is at stake in 
such conflicts of interest and that the rich are not so rich that they can corrupt the 
political system and bend it to their will. 
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III. Distributive Justice or Charity? 
Duarte: Currently, the distribution of resources, opportunities, or capabilities is 
usually concentrated within national borders. International organizations attempting 
to expand assistance irrespective of national borders, such as UNICEF, the World 
Food Programme, and Médecins Sans Frontières, are often not financed by taxes, but 
by charity. This becomes problematic, especially when the continual demands of such 
institutions provoke what you call “fatigue, aversion, and contempt (…) toward the 
‘aid’ they dispense and its recipients” (Pogge 2010: 55). How would your proposal of a 
Global Resources Dividend (Pogge 2008: 202-21) change this relationship? 
Pogge: At least in the old days, especially under the perspective of the centrality of 
the nation-state, we thought about measures to protect the poor as charitable 
measures. We saw gross salaries as reflecting what each person contributes to the 
social product, and we then saw it as charity when the rich paid higher taxes than 
the poor, thereby shouldering a larger share of the burden of maintaining the 
institutions of government. This perception of charity was especially compelling in 
regard to government programmes that disproportionately benefit the poor. So the 
state was defending a social and economic order that maintained great inequality 
and was nonetheless presented and perceived as enforcing charity for the poor at the 
expense of the rich through “redistributive” taxation. The underlying picture here is 
that the distribution of income and wealth in a society is the product of two steps: at 
step 1, people receive a share of the social product that reflects their contribution to 
it; and at step 2, some of these assets are charitably redistributed by the state so as to 
make the smaller shares large enough to sustain a minimally decent life.  
The fundamental flaw in this picture is the characterization of step 1. Among the 
essential contributions to the social product are, for example, material assets such as 
land and natural resources. These assets do not naturally belong to their owners but 
are assigned to them pursuant to the rules of a specific property system. Such rules 
typically prescribe that land can be privately owned and accumulated in unlimited 
quantities, but they might equally well prescribe that land belongs to the community 
and can be rented for long periods through a competitive bidding process. The 
choice between such alternative property regimes has a profound impact on the 
distribution of income and wealth. Thus, while it is true that a person’s position in 
an existing economic hierarchy depends on his or her own efforts (as well as, 
typically, on those of his or her ancestors), this position, and the entire shape of the 
distribution, also depend profoundly on the ground rules of the economy. This 
insight undermines the idea that the step1 distribution is somehow a natural 
reflection of the contribution or merit of individuals. And it thereby also 
undermines the idea that step 2 involves charitable re-distribution. Step 2 is better 
seen as an integral part of the existing property regime, without which this regime 
might be morally unacceptable as well as unable to maintain itself politically. 
Once we understand this point, we are able to rightly conceive that the question 
is not about redistributive justice, where we have an initial distribution that gets 
rectified. Rather, the question is simply about distributive justice. In this 
perspective, we ask: how should an existing social product be distributed? How 
much should go to landowners? Should landowners be entitled to the full amount 
they can extract for contributing their land to production or only to some part 
thereof? Then, when one society taxes land holdings or the income derived from 
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land holdings, it has an economic or property system that is different from that of 
another country with different ownership conditions. Everyone who owns land does 
so, from the start, on the understanding that the privilege of ownership comes with 
certain obligations. There is nothing unjust about such obligations as such—just 
different ways of organizing property rights and land ownership.  
The same points apply at the international level, with regard to my proposal of a 
Global Resources Dividend, for example. With such a GRD in place, the privilege of 
national domain over some given territory is understood, from the start, as tied to 
each society’s obligation to share with the rest of humankind some of the value of 
any territorial resources it chooses to exploit. Why should this not be a perfectly 
sound interpretation of the plausible idea that the Earth belongs to all human beings 
in common? Think hypothetically about human beings taking stewardship of this 
planet, knowing very little about where its valuable resources might be located. 
What system of national property should they institute? There is no natural or self-
evident answer to this question—no natural facts we could rely on to determine how 
the world’s land should be divided and what rights exactly each society should have 
over and within its territory. It is an open question how we should regulate 
ownership rights and decide who should get what part of the value of natural 
resources—an open question to be decided in light of considerations of feasibility 
and efficiency, of course, but also in light of moral concerns and arguments. 
In thinking about which rules to adopt, we should—in part, at least—judge any 
proposed system of rules on the basis of its foreseeable effects. Different systems 
would have different effects. The GRD system concedes that, for each chunk of 
natural resources, there ought to be just one agent in control. We do not want 
everybody to own a share in every bit of the globe; that would be far too complicated 
and unwieldy. Yet, we also cannot endorse a system, such as we have now, where 
many people cannot get even a remotely proportional share of the natural resources 
humanity is extracting from this planet. Nor can we accept that contingencies, such 
as the scarcity or abundance of water or oil in some particular territory, say, have an 
excessively large impact on the fate of its inhabitants. The GRD might then be a 
reasonable compromise: each society has full control of the resources within its 
territory, but, when it decides to make use of any of these resources, then it must 
share a small part of the value of these resources with the rest of humankind and 
specifically with the global poor who would otherwise get much less than a fair 
share of our planet’s resource wealth. This is the basic idea of the GRD. It is just a 
different way of conceiving property rights from the standard way. We have to be 
careful, however, to avoid misunderstanding this idea. In the twentieth century, the 
developing countries fought hard to win full sovereignty over the resources in their 
territory. This was an important struggle, and I do not want anyone to think that I 
seek to have its outcome reversed. My proposal is merely that poor and rich 
countries alike share a small portion of the value of any national resources they 
choose to use while retaining full control over the decision whether and how to use 
their national resources. It is also worth emphasizing, in addition, that most of the 
cost of this GRD would ultimately fall upon the end-users of natural resources, as 
most of the required dividend payments would be passed along through higher 
prices. The richer people are the ones with higher consumption, so they would be 
disproportionately affected by an increase in the price of resource-intensive kinds of 
consumption (such as air travel). Poorer people would be net beneficiaries, as the 
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revenues from the GRD would be spent for their benefit. And all people, including 
future generations, would benefit from the disincentive (through higher prices) 
against resource-intensive consumption.  
Duarte: Are you suggesting that there should be a difference between land ownership 
and land management in the case of the nation states? 
Pogge: There is certainly a difference. The GRD does not take away any of the 
management rights from countries. The management rights or the right to control 
the natural resources available within their territory would definitely stay with the 
countries, and in this sense the historical victory of the developing countries in their 
struggle to free themselves from colonialism would remain intact. 
To clarify the distinction, imagine, for example, that there is a large amount of oil 
situated under a holy site of a certain country. If the people in this country decide 
not to extract the oil in order not to disturb the holy site, their decision should be 
respected. These people should not even be charged, in my view, for the privilege of 
blocking access to this resource, because any such charge might put undue pressure 
on them to reluctantly permit its extraction. If these people decide, however, to 
extract the resource for their own benefit, then they would on my proposal be 
required to share some small fraction of the market value of the extracted resource 
on the principle that the Earth belongs to all human beings in common and that it 
would be wrong to exclude—as is the current practice—the world’s poor from their 
fair share of our planet’s natural wealth.  
In the present system, rich people monopolize the natural resources of our 
planet. Rich people in one country claim ownership over its natural resources and 
then sell them to other affluent people often residing in other countries. All this 
happens by mutual consent with nice mutually agreeable contracts under which the 
resources are processed and finally consumed by affluent people. The world’s 
poor—and this easily includes the entire poorer half of humanity which currently 
receives only three per cent of global household income—cannot get access to more 
than a tiny fraction of a proportional share of the natural resources extracted, and 
this is, in my view, very unfair. 
Duarte: It is certainly unfair. With a global resources dividend system the poor would 
be much less vulnerable to exploitation. Brazil is a country very rich in natural 
resources, but the resources are still controlled by elites. By distributing these resources 
to the whole population, Brazil would certainly improve considerably in terms of 
development, right? 
Pogge: Yes, this would surely be a huge boost to development. It would allow poor 
people to partake in the resource wealth of the country, which should not benefit 
merely a few rich owners, but all Brazilians. Everyone should partake in natural 
resource wealth because no one has a prior or superior claim to any of these 
resources. We have a collective responsibility to regulate the exploitation of natural 
resources in such a way that no one is excluded from a fair share. This means, in 
particular, that no one should be allowed to benefit from a much larger than average 
share without compensating those who are reduced to much smaller than average 
shares. 
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IV. Global Institutions and the Combat of Poverty in Brazil 
Duarte: What is, in your opinion, the role of global institutions in the 
increase/decrease of poverty in Brazil in the last decade? Do you think that this role 
will change from now on, since the Brazilian Roberto Azevedo has been selected to be 
the next director of the World Trade Organization (WTO)? 
Pogge: The role of the global institutions with regard to poverty in Brazil will 
probably not change significantly. This is because decisions by the World Trade 
Organization are made by consensus, which is driven by the very unequal 
bargaining power of the member states. With their enormous economic and 
military might, Western countries will remain the dominant powers in the WTO, 
even if a Brazilian becomes the body’s director. Of course, Brazil is a rising power. It 
is the seventh-largest economy in the world and, given its size and resources, has a 
very realistic opportunity to overtake the United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
Japan in the near future. Brazil’s influence is increasing also because it has 
intelligently aligned itself within the IBSA countries: India and South Africa. They 
have formed a powerful partnership of rapidly growing countries, which now have 
substantial influence in and through the G20. This will increasingly help Brazil to 
develop, to achieve solid rates of economic growth and to protect its interests. It is 
true that Brazil was badly treated in earlier decades, severely exploited by 
multinational banks and corporations backed by the United States, which also 
supported and collaborated with the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. These 
were unhappy times for Brazil in many ways, politically and economically. 
Nevertheless, Brazil has now emerged as a country that has largely emancipated 
itself from this sort of foreign pressure and domination. Brazil cannot be pushed 
around any more, like it was pushed around twenty, thirty years ago, and this 
certainly bodes well for progress, prosperity and development.  
The great danger now, however, is that both national and supranational 
institutional arrangements will benefit some Brazilians at the expense of the great 
majority of their compatriots. Such arrangements might be shaped to aggravate 
existing social and economic inequalities, which in Brazil are already enormous. 
This is something we have witnessed all over the world during the last 30 years or 
so: globalization has led to socio-economic polarization in most countries including, 
rather dramatically, China and the United States. In recent years, Brazil has 
managed to escape this trend. Through policies initiated by Lula,10 Brazil has 
actually reduced inequality over the last ten years. But to put this in perspective, I 
should add that when Lula was elected, inequality in Brazil was among the very 
highest in the world and it is still very high in comparison to inequality in other 
countries, especially outside Latin America and Southern Africa. Inequality in Brazil 
is deeply entrenched and therefore hard to dislodge: it is strongly correlated with 
race and transmitted from one generation to the next by means of a highly unequal 
education system. Still, overall I am cautiously optimistic that progress can continue 
with democratic support from a majority of Brazil’s citizens.  
Progress on the inequality front will have to be achieved against the influence 
exerted by global institutional arrangements, which generally favour greater 
inequality. This is hardly surprising. These global institutional arrangements have 
rapidly become much denser and more influential during the globalization push of 
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the last 30 years. These new global rules (such as those of the WTO), which now 
reach deep into the inner lives of national societies, were shaped by the governments 
of the leading developed states, and these governments in turn were heavily 
influenced by the interests of their most powerful constituents: multinational 
corporations, large banks, industry associations, hedge funds and billionaires. As a 
result, globalization is benefitting the rich at the expense of the poor in many 
different ways. This is not a fact about globalization as such, but a fact about this 
globalization: globalization under the specific rules and agencies that have emerged 
or been strengthened over the last 30 years or so. 
One could give many examples; here are four: the permitted protectionism the 
rich countries managed to get “grandfathered” into the WTO Agreement to protect, 
in particular, their domestic agriculture at the expense of farmers in the poor 
countries; the very strong intellectual property rules the rich countries imposed 
upon the rest through the TRIPs Agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) (Annex 1C of the WTO Agreement); an international tax system 
that in effect enables multinational corporations to shift their profits into tax havens 
and thus to avoid paying taxes in the developing countries where their profits 
originate; and the facilitation of large, quick and secret movements of capital across 
national borders, which supports tax evasion, embezzlement, money laundering, 
human and drug trafficking, terrorism as well as other forms of crime especially in 
the developing world. These rules affect Brazil and harm, in particular, its poor: 
sharecroppers, patients and those who depend on the society’s social safety net. 
These same rules also benefit some rich Brazilians who can, for example, keep their 
wealth in secrecy jurisdictions abroad and thus avoid paying taxes on their earnings 
from capital. This is actually quite common. The Boston Consulting Group 
estimates that Latin Americans keep an unimaginable US $1 trillion abroad; that is 
25.6 per cent of their collective financial wealth, while the analogous estimates for 
North America and Europe are 1.8 per cent and 7.9 per cent, respectively.11 
Obviously, when poor countries are unable to tax capital income, they must cut 
back government services or get more of their revenues from taxes on labour 
income and from consumption taxes, which place greater burdens on the poor.  
Now it should also be said that the Brazilian government has taken intelligent steps 
to improve its tax collection from rich individuals and especially from multinational 
corporations. Brazil has a comparatively well-run tax system that works better than 
those in other Latin American countries and much better than those in Africa. Still, 
Brazil would benefit from international reforms that would increase financial 
transparency at both the domestic and global levels in order to curb tax avoidance 
and evasion. Among the most important reforms, governments should mandate: (1) 
disclosure of the ultimate beneficial owners of companies and of the controlling 
parties of trusts and foundations; (2) public country-by-country reporting of profits 
and other tax-relevant information by multinational enterprises; (3) automatic 
exchange of tax-relevant financial information by national tax authorities 
worldwide; (4) public reporting on funds paid to governments for the extraction of 
natural resources and on the use of those funds; and (5) tough sanctions, including 
jail time, for professionals who facilitate illicit financial flows, for instance senior 
officers from global banks, accounting firms, law firms, insurance companies and 
hedge funds. In addition, governments should commit to: (6) harmonizing anti-
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money laundering regulations internationally; and (7) carrying out clear, reliable, 
frequent and timely public fiscal reporting as well as opening up their fiscal policy-
making process to public participation.12 Such reforms would promote greater 
domestic resource mobilization in Brazil and especially also in other, poorer 
developing countries. 
 
V. National Partiality and Impartiality in Government Decisions 
Duarte: For a long time, Brazil was a debtor of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). However, the situation has changed and from debtor it became creditor of 
IMF. Brazil is lending US $10 billion to the organization in order to help bail 
European countries out of their current crisis.13 Such government decisions can, 
perhaps, be seen as “impartial” from a national standpoint since, besides reducing the 
high rates of poverty within the country, the money is going to be used to help richer 
countries—which until now have benefited from the Brazilian debt with IMF. In your 
book (Pogge 2010: 23-4), you said that “partiality of concern is alright within a 
minimally fair setting, but not all right when it seeks to undermine the minimal 
fairness of this setting itself.” So, my question is: Does impartiality of concern have this 
minimal fair setting as well? And if it does, do you think that Brazil is overlooking 
these limits when lending money to the IMF? 
Pogge: The system that we have at the moment is certainly not a fair system that 
takes equally into account the interests of rich and poor people. For this reason, 
even when not privileging its citizens, the government is not totally impartial. The 
system we live under is designed by the rich for the rich. Certainly, the system is in 
the first instance designed by nation states, by governments and by their delegated 
negotiators who sit together to decide what the rules of the game should be, in the 
context of the G20, for example. These governments are, however, influenced by 
their most powerful constituents—by big national industry associations, 
multinational corporations, banks, hedge funds, billionaires—and unfortunately, 
the Brazilian government is no exception. Government policies, especially foreign 
policies and negotiating positions in international negotiations, are very heavily 
moulded by a country’s most powerful constituents, and governments pay far more 
attention to these powerful constituents than to the poorer majority of the country 
who often lack the time and education to form opinions on these matters. As a 
result, the supranational rules of the game, for example those structuring the world 
economy, are certainly not impartial, certainly not based on the equally weighted 
interests of all participants.  
Now, your question is whether it is all right for Brazil to help overcome the 
financial crisis in Europe, to give some money to the IMF for the purposes of 
assisting the Europeans. Now, this is not money given as a donation; it is rather a 
loan given to the Europeans to shore up their financial system. You might say this is 
part of a cooperative system, a special sort of insurance scheme where, in case any 
country falls upon hard times, it can count on the assistance of others, through 
loans, not through gifts. So it’s a bit like a scheme of fire insurance: if someone’s 
house catches fire, then one gets financial assistance for rebuilding, assistance that is 
funded from the insurance premium of many other homeowners. But there is still 
this difference, that homeowners get the rebuilding money as a grant whereas 
countries get IMF funds as a loan that must eventually be paid back.  
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In principle, such an insurance scheme is valuable because the overall financial 
system is an important part of the infrastructure that makes the whole global 
economic system function. The North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008 was, and still 
is, a danger to the whole world. Fortunately, the crisis was reasonably contained 
before producing more damage around the world. It strongly affected the United 
States and Europe, but it did not really affect Brazil and most other less-developed 
countries. It affected China because China is a major exporter to the United States 
and the European Union. Brazil was less affected because the principal destination 
of its exports is China. In any case, any national economy today depends on the 
health of the global financial system, and it is therefore in each country’s interest to 
contribute to a fair and effective scheme for stabilizing the world financial system 
through mutual lending.  
Apart from the nice symbolic significance of Brazil’s contributing US $10 billion 
(along with other less developed countries) to this bailout of Europe, Brazil benefits 
from its loan insofar as it will be able to call upon similar support in case of 
domestic financial difficulties and also insofar as its economic position benefits 
from a deeper and more severe crisis being averted in Europe and in the United 
States. To be sure, we must always remember that the present global financial 
system is not a fair or just system. It is a system skewed in favour of the rich. Still, a 
deepening of the North Atlantic crisis would have had an adverse impact on Brazil 
and its citizens. Although some clever rich people in Europe and in North America 
were able to make a lot of money on the crisis, this was a tiny minority. The vast 
majority, rich and poor alike, were hurt by the crisis. And because the harm was so 
widespread, it was genuinely important, I think, to contain this harm, to make sure 
that the crisis did not become deeper and did not spread into the far more 
vulnerable poor countries. Given all this, it was the right policy decision to 
participate in loans to Europe to help bail out the countries most affected by the 
crises.  
 
VI. Owl of Minerva Spreading its Wings before the Falling of Dusk 
Duarte: According to you, for the first time the owl of Minerva is finally “spreading its 
wings well before the falling of dusk,” and this means that philosophy has actually 
“been giving an important conceptual impulse to economics, political science, and 
politics” (Pogge 2010: 25). Will philosophy influence the agenda post-2015 after the 
first UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)? What measures could be taken to 
limit the possibilities of moving the goal posts and of ensuring that poverty is finally 
defeated?   
Pogge: We are certainly living in a very important time in history. It is a time in 
which the global institutional architecture is being shaped and in which philosophy 
can potentially provide important normative input. We also had such a period of 
globalization and institutional reshaping in the late nineteenth to early twentieth 
century, but it came to an abrupt and tragic halt with the First World War. It started 
up a little bit again in the 1920s, but then came the even more horrendous Second 
World War, of course. Now we are making the third attempt towards a more 
cosmopolitan order, and this time it looks like such an order will be established and 
become irreversible. We are building a new global institutional infrastructure, and 
the rules of this infrastructure are now in the process of being shaped. To build and 
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understand this infrastructure, new concepts and theories are necessary: in law, in 
political science, in economics and also in philosophy.  
The emergence of a dense and highly influential global institutional order can be 
compared to the building of a city, such as New York, for example. New York 
changes all the time, as people, companies and industries come and go, as buildings 
get torn down and erected, as transportation and communication systems get 
modernized. And yet, the basic features of the city stay much the same, even over 
centuries: the grid of streets, the location of the parks, subway lines, bridges and 
tunnels, and so on. These basic features have tremendous inertia; they could be 
altered, but it would be extremely difficult to do so—not only because of the 
enormous expense involved but also because of the vested interests that have 
formed around these features. Early decisions about the basic features of the city 
thus turned out to have a profound influence lasting for centuries. It is similar, I 
think, with the early decisions that are now being made about the emerging global 
institutional infrastructure. These basic features, too, will be deeply entrenched by 
the complexity and expense of altering them as well as by the vested interests that 
are forming around them. More than most other generations in human history, we 
are profoundly shaping the future of humanity, not just for the next few decades, 
but for centuries and (if humanity is so lucky!) millennia to come.  
This rapid emergence of a critically important global institutional infrastructure 
has been going on for 30 years. And it has in many ways been badly designed, 
morally speaking, in blatant disregard of the needs and interests of the poorer 
majority of humankind. My generation bears a grave responsibility in this regard. 
The more progressive people of my generation—those who are concerned about 
severe poverty and excessive inequality, those who care about human rights and 
about genuine political participation for all—have, by and large, missed these 
developments. The global corporate elites, the leaders of business and finance, on 
the other hand, were highly alert. Overcoming many differences among themselves, 
they have managed to bring enormous influence to bear on the most powerful 
politicians and have essentially succeeded in shaping the new global institutional 
infrastructure according to their shared interests. To be sure, these elites bear no ill 
will against the poorer majority, not at all. They merely give priority to their own 
interests. Their great influence thus results in global institutional arrangements that 
secure them a large and ever-increasing share of global income, which of necessity is 
associated with rising global inequality and with the persistence of severe poverty as 
the poorer half of humankind has been reduced to barely 3 per cent of global 
household income. 
Regulatory capture—politicians and regulators coming under the influence of 
wealthy elites who then dominate the formulation and application of rules—has 
destructive effects not only on the poor. It also leads to regulatory incoherence and 
to the neglect of the future. Regulatory incoherence occurs because elite players 
differ with regard to which rules and regulations will affect them the most. This is 
where each will concentrate its lobbying efforts. As a result, different parts of the 
emerging supranational institutional infrastructure are shaped by different interest 
groups rather than designed for optimal coherence and effectiveness with regard to 
some chosen purpose. Neglect of the future occurs because elite players are focused 
on the short term. The CEOs of powerful banks or corporations typically have just a 
few years until retirement and, during this time, their retention and pay are 
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massively dependent on their performance relative to that of their peers at 
competing enterprises. The long-term health of the world’s economy and ecology 
has no impact on their bonuses and stock options. Hedge fund managers and most 
large investors are even more clearly focused on the near term. They can quickly 
switch investments and even “go short” and thereby avoid, or even profit from, any 
long-term adverse effects of their decisions and lobbying efforts. Regulatory capture 
magnifies these pathologies insofar as enterprise leaders’ myopic appetite for short-
term profits comes to dominate not merely the operations of their respective 
enterprises but also the policies and institutional-design preferences of their state. 
Just think about it: the United States is involved in international negotiations whose 
outcome will shape important aspects of the world economy for centuries, and the 
US position is formulated by a bunch of powerful enterprise leaders focused on the 
vast sums they can earn if their respective enterprises make extraordinary profits in 
the next few years. 
Obviously, we need a far more thoughtful and democratic way of building the 
infrastructure of our increasingly interdependent world. We would be better off if 
we could think more holistically and universalistically about the kind of cosmopolis 
we want to build—about the basic features of a political and economic order that 
could last for centuries. It is in this regard that the owl of Minerva must spread its 
wings before the falling of dusk: Philosophy can, and should, and is beginning to, 
play a more constructive role in shaping and revising the emerging global 
infrastructure with an eye to humanity’s long-term future. Given that our 
institutional design decisions in this crucial phase of human history will profoundly 
affect the future, we have a responsibility to make these decisions with all the 
foresight we can reasonably summon. We have to think seriously and with the best 
academic inputs about how a future fully globalized world should best be governed, 
how its economic system should work, how its financial system should be designed. 
How can we envision, a century in the future, a world order that ensures safety, 
freedom and prosperity for all human beings and is politically reachable from where 
we are? If we don’t face this question systematically, if we just muddle through as 
directed by the momentary agreements among short-term orientated political and 
economic elites, then humanity is highly unlikely to attain such a morally liveable 
world. In fact, we may fail our very first serious test as a species: The challenge of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
About the development goals post-2015, in my lecture at the conference on 
Realizing Global Justice: Theory and Practice at the UiT The Arctic University of 
Norway,14 I gave a summary of what I think would be goals of the right kind. They 
differ from the goals that are standardly discussed, such as the MDGs and also their 
successors, the “Sustainable Development Goals”, drafted by a high-level panel of 
eminent persons.15 The goals I advocate differ in that they commit states not merely 
to the proposition that some outcomes ought to happen, but to concrete changes in 
the existing institutional arrangements that would actually lead to these outcomes. 
It is easy to endorse a list of pious wishes: less poverty, more female education, less 
corruption, better health care. But these good things are not going to happen just 
because a lot of states agree that they should. What we need is agreement on who is 
supposed to do what to bring about these good things. For example, to reduce 
poverty in the less developed countries, we need to stop their being drained of 
capital and tax revenues by their own economic and political elites and by the 
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accounting gimmicks of multinational enterprises. We need to dismantle the 
financial-secrecy infrastructure of tax havens, shell companies, secrecy jurisdictions 
and anonymous trusts with their sleazy banks, lawyers and accountants. Concerted 
action by the affluent states could easily achieve a massive reduction in illicit 
financial flows. And, driven by post-crisis public anger in these countries, there is 
actually a great deal of movement now in this direction, in the OECD and the G20, 
most visibly. This is a great opportunity to achieve the necessary reforms of the 
international financial system. Here it is crucial that the reforms fully include the 
needs and interests of the less developed countries, which suffer vastly more from 
this problem than affluent countries do. So what goals or targets might countries 
agree upon to really tackle this problem? Well, for example the seven reforms I 
mentioned earlier. 
Duarte: You, Sen, and others have heavily criticized the way poverty has been 
measured (Pogge 2010, 57-74). Could you quickly update us with your final findings 
on the development of a holistic way of measuring poverty (Pogge 2010, 75-92)? 
Pogge: In May 2013 we had the final conference in Oslo where we presented the 
results of our research project Measuring Poverty and Gender Disparity.16 This was 
a three-year project of participatory research where we talked with poor people in 
18 different sites—one urban, one rural and one marginalized community in each of 
Angola, Fiji, Indonesia, Malawi, Mozambique, and the Philippines—in order to 
understand what they think poverty is all about. Our work consisted of three phases. 
The first phase featured unstructured conversations exploring what constitutes 
poverty, what the different levels and dimensions of poverty are and how sex and 
age affect the reality and experience of poverty. From this phase, 25 dimensions of 
poverty emerged, and we used these as the basis for our more structured interviews 
in the second phase. On the basis of these interviews, we reduced our measure to 15 
important dimensions, distinguishing five levels in each. We also assigned different 
weights to the dimensions and to the intervals between levels in each dimension; the 
lowest interval in the most important dimensions received 12 times as much weight 
as the highest interval in the least important dimensions. Accommodating the 
reflections of poor people themselves, we ended up with a measure of poverty that is 
multidimensional, gender-sensitive in its choice of dimensions and also 
individualistic by assessing the deprivations and hardships of each person (when 
nearly all other measures of poverty base the poverty status of persons on the 
condition of the household they belong to). In the third phase, which we had funds 
to run only in the Philippines, we actually used the poverty measure we had 
developed for a survey of a random sample of some 1800 people in order to learn 
how poor people do by the light of our metric and whether this metric offers an 
appropriate way of measuring poverty and gender disparities. Here we found one 
very surprising thing: poor women are slightly better off than poor men in the 
Philippines.  
Duarte: Is this because women would better administer their incomes? 
Pogge: This could well be part of the explanation. But in many cases the women and 
men live together in the same household, and so women’s more responsible money 
management should benefit both. Of course, the surprising result could be a fluke 
since the difference we found, albeit statistically significant, was small. But the fact 
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remains that we did not find what we expected to find: a clear advantage for males. I 
am sure we would have found such a male advantage in most other countries. 
Perhaps our result would not hold up statistically if one were to conduct a larger 
survey or if our survey had not missed a number of absent males. In any case, the 
result is not a huge embarrassment for our work insofar as much other fieldwork 
confirms that the Philippines is doing relatively well in terms of gender disparities. 
According to the 2013 Global Gender Gap Report,17 the Philippines is among the 
top countries in terms of gender equality, number five in the 2013 world ranking. 
This is not true of Brazil, I am sure.  
Duarte: No, unfortunately it is not. Even with a female president, I am afraid to say 
that Brazil is number sixty-two in the world ranking, way behind the Philippines.  
Pogge: I understand, and this is why it is so important to get funding to continue 
with this project. We hope that in the near future we will get funding to implement 
our phase-three survey in other countries, such as Fiji, for example.  
Duarte: What were the questions you used to build up your data?18  
Pogge: In different phases we worked with different questions. In the first phase, we 
started with very open questions, such as: are there different levels of poverty? There 
are certainly differentiations among the poor, but can one measure these 
differences? How do we recognize whether a person is poor or extremely poor? We 
received diverse answers in different countries. In some places, different levels of 
poverty are recognized by looking at how people sleep: some people sleep on the 
ground, some people sleep on a kind of mattress. In other countries, differentiations 
are based on how people are dressed, and so forth. We found more and more of this 
information and worked it into a schema of levels and dimensions: there are people 
who are poor, not so poor, and extremely poor. We found that some of the 
dimensions that poor people stress as important are, superficially at least, quite 
remote from what in ordinary affluent circles would be considered a marker of 
poverty. A very important part of the experience of being poor, for example, is 
vulnerability to violence. Being poor means being exposed to violence. Poor people 
typically do not have a house or apartment where they can just lock the door behind 
them and be safe. They may be homeless, perhaps living on the street or in some 
shelter that others can invade at any time. Very poor people also receive very little 
protection from the court system or from the police—in fact, violence against the 
poor is often perpetrated by the police! Poor people are endlessly abused, kicked 
around, mistreated—with impunity—by their “social betters” by supervisors or 
employers, by officials and by anyone who feels like it. The prominence poor people 
give to the experience of violence surprised us, but if this is what poor people say is 
an important part of poverty, then it is, and we have to pay attention to it, right?  
Duarte: What about happiness? Is happiness on your list? 
Pogge: No, we did not ask people about their subjective level of satisfaction or 
happiness. 
Duarte: Is this because happiness is very difficult to measure? 
Pogge: Yes, partly. But the fundamental problem is that a focus on happiness brings 
in normatively inappropriate factors including, in particular, a person’s ambitions 
and expectations. Somebody who is raised to expect very little is well adapted to her 
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lack of means and may well be content with a meagre, monotonous diet and 
primitive living conditions. Still, by raising people in this way, we are not 
overcoming poverty but, if anything, entrenching poverty by ensuring that people 
are well adapted to it. Think also of the parallel case of gender disparity. A country 
has not overcome gender disparity when its females are as happy with their 
subservient role as its males are with their much greater opportunities. This is not 
merely a conceptual point but a moral one: we ought to achieve a nutritious and 
diversified diet, hygienic and private sanitation, clean water, and so on, even for 
people whose extreme poverty has placed such achievements beyond their 
imagination. And we ought to achieve equal opportunities even for those girls and 
women whose life-long subordination has thwarted even the development of any 
such ambition. In this special case, where poor people’s ambitions are stunted by 
their circumstances, it would be inappropriate to use the former to validate the 
latter. This is not tantamount to asking policymakers to re-educate such people or 
to force them to accept the amenities of modern life. But, if they are serious about 
overcoming poverty, then policymakers should provide opportunities for a life free 
from deprivation, and these opportunities will then help ensure that the next 
generation, at least, will develop higher ambitions in terms of food, sanitation, 
shelter, education, health care, and absence of gender-based constraints. To be sure, 
with such higher ambitions comes loss of the capacity to be content with serious 
deprivations or with gender-based subservience. Endorsing this trade-off is a moral 
choice and, I think, the right moral choice—though I realize this is a large subject 
about which a lot more could be said. 
 
Notes 
1 Melina Duarte, PhD, is a Researcher in Political Philosophy at UiT The Arctic 
University of Norway. For more interviews, see: Duarte, M., Jakobsen & J., Dege, C. 
(2013: 171-183). She is most thankful to the Justice and Development Research 
Group, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, in Brazil, for valuable discussions 
on the topics of this interview. Contact: melina.duarte@uit.no.  
     The interview was held on 23 June, 2013, at UiT The Arctic University of 
Norway, on the occasion of the international conference on Realizing Global Justice: 
Theory and Practice. This interview is part of a series of interviews with the keynote 
speakers. The conference and the interview series were organized by the Pluralism, 
Democracy, and Justice Research Group funded by the Justice in Conflict Project 
(2010-2015), Research Council of Norway, in collaboration with the Brazilian 
magazine Filosofia Ciência & Vida, edited by Paula Palma Félix. 
2 The paper can be found at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/ 
1._Pogge.pdf. 
3 Read more about Thomas Pogge at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~tp4/. 
4 See links to Pogge’s TED talk about this topic and more information at 
http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_pogge_medicine_for_the_99_percent.html and 
www.healthimpactfund.org. See also: Hollis & Pogge (2008) and Pogge (2008: 222-
261). 
5 See Pogge (2008: 202–21). See also translation to Portuguese in Pogge (2013a: 99–
147). 
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6 See Pogge (2010: 75–92); Pogge & Rippin (2013b). See also 
www.genderpovertymeasure.org/. 
7 Pogge (2013c). 
8 See more information at http://www2.planalto.gov.br/especiais/caderno-
destaques/marco-2013/gestao-em-destaque/erradicacao-da-extrema-pobreza.  
9 See more about the benefits of the program at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
3QI1C7B5U0. 
10 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was President of Brazil from 2003 to 2011. In 2011, his 
successor, President Dilma Rousseff, was elected. In 2016, she was impeached.  
11 Boston Consulting Group (2013). Africa and the Middle East are doing even 
worse than Latin America: fully one third of their collective financial wealth is held 
abroad, about 1.6 trillion US-dollars.  
12 These were among the leading demands that emerged from a crowd-funded 
Delphi study (http://academicsstand.org/2014/05/asap-study-curbing-illicit-
financial-flows-post-2015) that ASAP completed with a panel of 29 leading experts.   
13 Watch the full lecture at http://mediasite.uit.no/Mediasite/Catalog/Full/ 
11629ab59d35420d8ab50d3ae1263be621. 
14 For the former, see The Millennium Development Goals Report 2014 (New York 
City, United Nations 2014), www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG% 
20report/MDG%202014%20English%20web.pdf. For the latter, see the current draft 
at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html. 
15 For first results on this research, see Pogge & Rippin 2013. Available at 
www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Pogge-Rippin_Universal-
Agenda-on-the-Multiple-Dimensions-of-Poverty.pdf and at http://www.gender 
povertymeasure.org/. 
16 See 2013 Report at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_ 
Report_2013.pdf. 
17 Questionnaires and final report are now available at 
www.genderpovertymeasure.org/publications/. 
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